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Abstract 
Urbanization is a growing phenomenon in the UEMOA countries, in a context of the increasing informalization 
of its economies. Based on these facts, this research set out to analyze the relationship between urbanization and 
the size of the informal economy. This research uses the Pooler Mean Group (PMG) model to analyze the effects 
of urbanization on informality, and the Panel Threshold Regression (PTR) model for nonlinear analysis. It 
appears that the rate of urbanization has a positive effect on the size of the informal economy. Also, that the 
quality of institutions can reduce the above positive effect, reducing the rate of urbanization. 
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1. Introduction 
Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the regions where the informal economy weighs the most with an average of 
around 38% of GDP between 2010 and 2014 against 34% for Southeast Asia and 23% for Europe (Medina and 
Schneider, 2018). The WAEMU countries are not left out. In fact, the contribution of the informal sector to GDP 
represents more than 50% of the overall added value of GDP, more than 80% of total employment and more than 
90% of newly created jobs in these countries (Mbaye, 2014). . Also, the informal sector is the main provider of 
jobs in developing countries. As Charmes (2010) notes, the informal sector accounts for between 65% and 80% 
of urban employment in the capitals of WAEMU countries.  
These facts notwithstanding, it appears that urbanization is another phenomenon common to developing 
countries. . Indeed, the World Bank's report on urbanization in Africa admits that urbanization is a growing and 
worrying phenomenon. According to this same report, the urban population in Africa currently stands at 472 
million inhabitants, but it will double over the next twenty-five years, reaching one billion inhabitants in 2040. 
Also, he specifies that as soon as 2025, African cities will be home to an additional 187 million inhabitants, 
equivalent to the current population of Nigeria (World Bank, 2017). In the case of cities in WAEMU countries, 
the urbanization of these cities is increasing. In fact, the urbanization rate of the area increased from 33.04% on 
average per year over the period 2000-2010 to nearly 40% over the period 2011-2019. This growing urbanization 
is the source of various problems. Indeed, migrants are confronted with problems of housing, employment etc., 
all of which lead to a deterioration in the standard of living. Also, this phenomenon creates the expansion of 
slums, inadequate infrastructure, rising rent costs, insecurity etc. 
These facts lead us to ask the question whether this growth urbanization is not the basis of the growing 
informalisation of the countries of the zone. This research therefore sets itself the objective of determining the 
role of urbanization in the development of informality. This relationship which seems to be analyzed very little 
in the literature, particularly with regard to the WAEMU countries. It will shed light on the political authorities 
on the consequences of urbanization at the economic level. The research is organized as follows: first we present 
the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between urbanization and informality, then we present 
the stylized facts for the study area, and finally we present the methodology and results of the research. 
 
2. Literature 
The relationship between urbanization and the informal sector is established in both theoretical and empirical 
literature. Indeed, on a theoretical level, according to authors such as Harris and Todaro (1969), migrants go to 
the city in the hope of finding a good job in the formal sector. But there, the difficulty of integrating into the 
formal sector led them to take up informal jobs. It should be noted that it is difficult for rural people, who are 
mostly inexperienced and qualified, to be able to find formal employment. As Cole and Sanders (1985) note it 
can take 50 years. As a result, many of the new city dwellers are never able to move to the formal sector, leading 
to congestion in the informal sector. Therefore, as urbanization continues, it often results in a large informal 
labor force. The shift from the rural informal sector to the urban informal sector can be explained by several pull 
and push factors. In many cases, the urban informal sector offers better opportunities than the rural sector. 
Incomes may be higher in urban informal employment than in rural occupations, and urban areas tend to provide 
better public services due to an urban bias in policies (Lipton, 1976). Even in cases where the conditions 
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between two sectors are similar, many individuals prefer the urban informal sector in the hope of finding a future 
employment opportunity in the formal sector (Banerjee, 1983). Also, according to Todaro (1997), rural-urban 
migration is the source of growing unemployment and therefore large size of informality. Indeed, he explains 
that the growing urbanization of African cities is at the root of the rise in unemployment rates. These 
unemployed people, for the most part unskilled, develop small activities to survive, which leads to an increase in 
informal activities. It also appears that although the formal sector may not create enough jobs for new city 
dwellers, people still prefer to migrate to cities, which stimulates the growth of the informal economy (Elgin and 
Oyvat, 2013). Cole and Sanders (1985) provide a further analysis on the issue. They admit that the growth of the 
formal urban sector increases the demand for the products of the urban subsistence sector. As a result, urban 
living wages would increase, which would increase the urban and rural subsistence wage gap. Hence, migration 
would be stimulated. Safa (1986) reviews the historical process of urbanization and industrialization in Latin 
America resulting from changes in the mode of incorporation into the capitalist world economy from the colonial 
period to the contemporary period. She finds that the growth of the urban informal economy in Latin America is 
the result of the international division of labor, which has forced many countries to increasingly turn to export 
manufacturing to alleviate their external debt and the current economic crisis. It shows that the majority of 
manufacturing production takes place through the informal sector. Because the latter is able to produce more 
cheaply by using more vulnerable segments of the workforce, such as women, and bypassing labor laws 
designed to protect workers such as minimum wages, social benefits and adequate working conditions. 
Empirically, Gundogan and Bicerli (2009) show that the rapid and uncontrolled migration created by the 
displacement of the population from rural to urban areas poses serious problems from a labor market perspective. 
The increase in rural-urban migration flows contributes to a greater supply of urban labor. This growing supply 
of labor has produced an increasing urban unemployment rate and a deterioration in the quality of employment, 
leading to increasing rates of informal employment. According to these authors, one of the most distinctive 
features of the economies of developing countries is the fact that more than half of workers are employed in the 
urban informal sector. They find that urbanization and the informal sector are phenomena which evolve in the 
same direction. In other words, for these authors, an increase in urbanization leads to an increase in the size of 
the informal sector. Elgin and Oyvat (2013) examine the empirical relationship between the level of urbanization 
and the size of the informal economy using cross-national datasets, representing GDP and sector employment 
shares of informal urban. Their results indicate that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
informality and the level of urbanization. In other words, the share of the informal sector increases in the early 
stages of urbanization due to several pull and push factors; however, it tends to drop in the later stages. Rauch 
(1993) had obtained the same results for the countries of Latin America. 
 
3. Stylized facts 
This analysis presents the graphical analysis and the descriptive analysis for the case of UEMOA. 
• Graphical analysis 
The graph below shows the evolution of the urbanization rate and the size of the informal economy in the area, 
over the period 1996 to 2017. It appears that the urbanization rate has an increasing trend throughout study 
period. As for the size of the informal economy, it is changing up and down. Indeed, over the period 1991-1993, 
there was an increase in the size of the informal sector. On the other hand, over the period 1993 to 2015, we note 
a downward trend in the size of informality in the area. Finally, over the 2015-2017 period, we note a resumption 
of informality in the area. 
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Graph: Joint evolution of the urbanization rate and the size of the informal economy in the UEMOA zone 
over the period 1991-2017 
Source: author using data from WDI (2018), IMF (2018) 
• Descriptive analysis 
Table 1 shows the results of the descriptive analysis. The table shows that informality is an important part of the 
economies of the zone. Indeed, it appears that the average size of the informal economy in the WAEMU zone 
represents 42.07% of GDP. This size varies between 29.4% and 60.8% over the period 1996 to 2017. This is not 
negligible. The average urbanization rate of 33.41%. This rate varies between 14.07% and 50.32%. The average 
per capita income in the area is 288,909 Fr CFA. Tax revenues represent on average 11.95% of GDP. The 
average unemployment rate for the area is 3.84%. This rate is relatively low, but does not represent the actual 
current situation. Indeed, the definition of the unemployment rate adopted is that of the International Labor 
Office (ILO), which does not respond to the realities of developing countries such as those in the area. The 
average primary school enrollment rate is 76.01% over the study period. As for the quality of public institutions, 
on a scale of 0 to 1, it is on average equal to 0.47 for the zone. 
Table 1: Descriptive analysis 
Variables Observations Moyenne Ecart Type Minimum Maximum 
Informal Economy 189 42,0754 6,619121 29,45 60,8 
Urbanization Rate 189 33,4101 10,89869 14,07 50,326 
GDP per Capta 189 288909,9 156421,6 130646,9 767297,7 
Taxation 189 11,95693 5,215633 3,109143 28,0206 
Unemployement 189 3,848349 2,603612 0,32 11,71 
Credit 189 16,43778 7,724096 3,302083 39,38639 
Education 183 76,01118 27,46384 26,4657 132,4683 
Agriculture 189 29,75393 8,336963 11,97997 44,14365 
Institutions 189 0,4725163 0,078214 0,2615734 0,6132592 
Source: author using data from WDI (2018), IMF (2018) 
 
4. Methodology 
This part proposes the specification of the theoretical and empirical model, the variables used and the data source 
and estimation techniques. 
 
4.1. Theoretical model 
The literature on the determinants of the informal economy is based on the Shleifer and Vishny (1993) model, 
which relates corruption and the development of the informal economy. Indeed, their model served as a 
theoretical and empirical framework (Choi and Thum, 2005; Rei and Bhattacharya, 2008; Dreher and Schneider, 
2009…) with some extensions. Thus, the theoretical analysis function is defined as follows: 
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 ? ?i iIE f UR Z            (1) 
Where IE is the size of the informal economy, UR is the rate of urbanization and a set of variables that influence 
the informal sector. 
 
4.2. Linear model specification 
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4.3. Non-linear or regime change model 
 Model presentation 
This section proposes a multi-regime modeling approach, initially proposed by Hansen (1999), which allows 
thresholds to be introduced in a static panel regression (Panel Threshold Regression: PTR). In these models, a 
transition mechanism takes place between the different regimes. This type of model makes it possible not only to 
determine the number of regimes for a variable, but also to estimate the threshold levels and the marginal impact 
of this variable.  
Hansen model (1999) with two regimes (one threshold) 
The general formulation of Hansen's model (1999) applied to this research and satisfying a PTR representation is 
as follows:  
it i 1 it 2 it it it=? β x +β x (q ; )+εIE      (3) 
Where it
IE
 is the dependent variable, i
µ
 individual fixed effects, 1 2β  et β parameter vectors 1K  , 
( ; )itq  denotes the transition function associated with transition variables ( itINST ) and a threshold 
parameter vector  ; itx is a vector of explanatory variables not containing the lagged explained variable; and it  
the error term independently and identically distributed
2(0; ) . The two-regime Hansen model can therefore be 
written as follows:  
it i 1 it it 2 it it it ity =? β x (q )+β x (q > )+ z +ε          (4) 
In this last equation, is the set of variables whose associated coefficients do not undergo a change from one 
regime to another.  
The process has two stages. The first step is to calculate the threshold value of institutional quality and the 
second to determine the number of threshold or regime change. Referring to Bayale (2017), we must first test the 
model for successive candidate values of γ by sequential least squares; the one that minimizes the sum of the 
squared residuals is chosen as the threshold value of institutional quality around which the regime change takes 
place. This can be expressed under the following constraint: 
ˆ argmin ( )nS   (5) 
According to several studies (Hansen, 1999; Bayale, 2017), critical values are estimated to determine the 95% 
confidence interval of the cut-off value for institutional quality, depending on the relationship:  
 : ( ) ( )    (6)LR C    
  
( )L R  gives an asymptotic distribution of the likelihood ratio statistic, while ( )C  showing 95% of this 
distribution. 
 Econometric analysis 
The inferences on the threshold models relate to tests of linearity, determination of the number of regimes and 
the construction of a confidence interval. The linearity test consists in showing that the threshold is statistically 
significant, and that the relationship between the variables can be represented according to a regime change 
model. This amounts to testing in equation (3.15) the null hypothesis 0 1 2
:H  
 against the alternative 
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hypothesis 1 1 2
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 is the sum of the squares of the linear model residuals and 1 1̂
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 the sum of the 
squares of the one-threshold model residuals.   
The test to determine the number of plans is applied in the presence of a proven threshold effect. The test 
procedure is similar to that of the linearity test. This is for example to test whether the model has two speeds or 
at least three speeds, and so on. The following statistic is constructed: 
1 1 2 1 2
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sum of the squares of the residuals of the three-regime model. The null hypothesis of a single threshold is 
rejected in favor of a minimum of two, if the value of 2
LR
is greater than the critical values. The process should 
continue to determine the maximum number of plans. When the threshold effect is proven and the threshold 
number is determined, Hansen (1999) shows that the thresholds 
ˆ
j  are convergent estimators of the true values, 
and that the asymptotic distribution of these is nonstandard. 
 
4.4. Preliminary tests on the data 
This part presents the dependency tests, unit root test, cointegration test, Hausman specification test. 
 Dependency test 
Niang (2011) explains that not taking into account a possible interindividual dependence in the data generation 
process can affect the results of stationarity and causality. To anticipate this eventuality, we perform various tests, 
namely the dependency tests. 
Annex Table 1 presents the results of the dependency tests (statistics from tests by Friedman (1937), Frees 
(1995), and Pesaran (2004)) for the model residuals. The results of the tests of independence at the level of the 
residuals and the variables do not allow the null hypothesis of independence between the individuals in the panel 
to be rejected (the probabilities associated with the tests are all greater than 0.05). Therefore, the stationarity 
studies are based on the first generation1 tests.  
 Unit root test 
The study of long-term relationships on panel data requires taking into account the problem of stationarity. To 
overcome this problem, a series of unit root tests has become a common approach for multivariate analysis on 
panel data. As the individual dependency hypothesis has not been accepted, first generation unit root tests will be 
used. 
Appendix Table 2 shows the results of the unit root tests of Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 2003) and Levin, Lin and 
Chu (LLC). We can deduce that the variables EI and INST are stationary in level. On the other hand, the 
variables TU, PIBh, TAX, TC, CI and EDU, are non-stationary and integrated of order one (I (1)). It is therefore 
necessary to check, if there is a bonus on board, a long-term relationship between the dependent variable and the 
explanatory variables. 
 Cointegration test 
Analogously to time series, the problem of spurious regression arises in the study of panel data. These tests, 
under the assumption of no cointegration, are based on the residuals of the estimates of the long-run relationship. 
As the results of the dependence tests have concluded that there is independence between the residues, the first 
generation Pedroni test can be used. 
Annex Table 3 shows the cointegration tests of Pedroni (1999, 2004). Note that the hypothesis of non-
cointegration is not rejected at the 5% threshold, for the panel v, panel rho, panel PP, panel ADF, group PP and 
group ADF tests. Only the rho group test rejects the null hypothesis of non-cointegration. It therefore appears 
that the variables are cointegrated. 
 Hausman test 
The panel therefore contains nonstationary and cointegrated variables. This led us to use a heterogeneous and 
non-stationary panel estimation model. The use of Pooled Mean Group (PMG) or Mean Group (MG) estimators 
is recommended for this purpose. These estimation methods are proposed respectively by Pesaran et al. (1999). 
These methods have a comparative advantage over conventional methods, because they allow the introduction of 
heterogeneity into certain coefficients to be estimated. Indeed, the PMG method assumes that the long-term 
coefficients of all countries are not significantly different, but on the other hand allows the short-term 
coefficients to be different. As for the MG method, it is used when the long-term coefficients are heterogeneous. 
The choice between the PMG and MG estimator is made by performing a Hausman specification test. 
 
1 If the null hypothesis of independence between the individuals in the panel were accepted, the unit root and cointegration tests would have 
focused on the second generation tests. 
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The probabilities of the Hausman statistics for the four (04) specifications of the model are all greater than the 
critical threshold of 0.05 (see Table 4 in the appendix). The null hypothesis of long-term homogeneity of the 
variables cannot therefore be rejected. So there are no noticeable long-term differences between the coefficients. 
The coefficients of the PMG estimator are therefore used because they are more appropriate. 
 Result of linearity test 
The results of the linearity and number of regimes tests are presented in Table 5 of the appendix. They show that 
the nonlinearity hypothesis is validated, due to the fact that the probabilities associated with LR tests are below 
the critical threshold of 5% a threshold. It also implies that there are two regimes in the relationship between the 
informal economy and urbanization, taking into account the level of institutions. It therefore appears that there is 
a given level that the quality of institutions must reach, so that urbanization is no longer a driver of informality. 
This threshold is 0.576. This means that the effect of urbanization on informality also depends on the quality of 
institutions. 
 
3.5. Empirical model  
The empirical model PMG to be estimated to analyze the linear effect of the urbanization rate on the size of the 
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 (7) 
The linearity test shows that there is only one threshold. We can therefore specify the following empirical PTR 
model, to analyze the nonlinear effect of urbanization on informality: 
it i 1 it it 1 2 it it 2 it it=? β (INST ) β (INST > )+ z +ε   IE UR UR         (8) 
EI is the dependent variable represented by the size of the informal sector or informal economy as a percentage 
of GDP. It is calculated using the MIMIC (Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes) econometric method. An 
increase in this variable also reflects a relatively larger size of the informal sector in the country. It is one of the 
most used measures and commonly recognized as reflecting the extent of informality in a country (Johnson et al, 
2000; Schneider and Enste, 2000; Botero et al., 2004; Dreher, Schneider, 2006; Torgler and Schneider, 2009; Rei 
and Bhattacharya, 2008; Ouédraogo, 2017; Medina and Schneider, 2018). Source: Médina and Schneider, (IMF, 
2018). 
UR: the urbanization rate, it represents the percentage of the urban population in the total population. According 
to authors such as Johnson et al. (2000), Friedman et al. (2000), Galli and Kucera (2004), the rate of urbanization 
is the factor that explains the development of the informal economy. 
INST: represents the institutional variable. The KKZ corruption control variable is used in this research. 
The discussion of the link between corruption and the development of the informal sector in the theoretical 
literature is not consensual. Rose-Ackerman (1997) finds that informality and corruption are substitutable. While 
Hindriks et al. (1999) argue that corruption between taxpayers and tax officials leads to undervaluation of the tax 
burden and leaks into the informal sector. Johnson et al (2000) and Friedman et al. (2000) explain that corruption 
leads to lower tax revenues in the formal economy and a deterioration in the quality of public administration. 
These facts therefore dissuade the incentive of agents to remain in the formal. They conclude that corruption 
drives the expansion of the informal sector. Therefore, one would expect a negative or positive relationship 
between corruption control and the size of the informal sector. Institutional data comes from the World Bank / 
World Governance Indicators database (BM / WGI, 2018). 
Z represents a set of variables influencing the size of the informal sector or control variables (real GDP per 
capita (GDPh)), domestic credit to the private sector (CI), tax revenue as a percentage of GDP (TAX)), 
unemployment rate (TC), Johnson et al. (2000), Friedman et al. (2000), Galli and Kucera (2004), as well as 
Dreher and Schneider (2009), Rei and Bhattacharya (2008), Torgler and Schneider (2009), and Dreher et al. 
(2009), establish a relationship between the size of the informal sector and these variables. Data on the other 
variables come from the World Bank's World Development indicators (WDI / BM, 2018). 
 
4. Results 
This part presents the short-term, long-term analysis of the effects of urbanization on growth as well as the non-
linear analysis of the conditional relationship between urbanization, the  
 Short term results 
The results of the short-term analysis are shown in Table 2 below. It appears that the rate of urbanization has no 
short-term effect on the size of the informal economy. On the other hand, the coefficient associated with real 
GDP per capita is negative and significant at the 1% threshold in both specifications. This means that an increase 
in real GDP per capita leads to a decrease in the size of the informal economy in the short run.  
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Table 2: Results of the short-term analysis 
VARIABLES EI EI ISEI ISEI 
     
Urbanization rate 1,617 -6,768 19.78 0.938 
 (3,871) (6,498) (25.50) (5.916) 
Real GDP per capita -0,000167*** -0,000161*** -0.000177*** -9.22e-05*** 
 (2,96e-05) (2,61e-05) (2.67e-05) (3.48e-05) 
Taxation 0,154 0,198 -0.0768 0.343 
 (0,157) (0,173) (0.203) (0.262) 
Unemployment 36,88 31,44 40.44 11.00 
 (36,32) (30,87) (40.10) (8.229) 
Education 0,181 0,155 0.409*** 0.368** 
 (0,126) (0,124) (0.137) (0.175) 
credit  0,0219 -0,0348 -0.0621 0.0812 
 (0,0952) (0,108) (0.169) (0.180) 
Agriculture -0,0952 -0,0903 -0.318* 0.0158 
 (0,0979) (0,0914) (0.187) (0.0651) 
Institutions  -7.729  2.773 
  (10.06)  (19.84) 
Source: author using data from IMF (2018), WDI (2018) and WGI (2018) 
Standard deviations are in parentheses 
(*), (**), (***) Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 Long term result 
The results of the long-term analysis are presented in the table below. It appears that the error correction 
coefficient is negative and significant at the rate of 1% for both specifications. This implies that the long term 
results are valid. Specification 1 (column 1) presents the results of the effects of urbanization on the informal 
economy. We see that the coefficient associated with the urbanization rate variable is positive and significant at 
the 5% threshold. In other words, if the urbanization rate increases by 1%, the size of the informal economy 
increases by 0.80%. Also, the coefficient associated with real GDP per capita is positive and significant at the 
5% level. It also appears that the coefficient associated with the unemployment rate is positive and significant at 
the 10% level. Specifically, a rise in the unemployment rate of 1% leads to an increase in the informal economy 
of 0.86%. Likewise, the coefficient associated with the agriculture variable is positive and significant at the 1% 
level. Indeed, an increase in the value added of agriculture to GDP of 1% leads to an increase in the size of the 
informal economy by 0.62%. On the other hand, the coefficient associated with the level of education is negative 
and significant at the 1% level. A 1% increase in the enrollment rate leads to a decrease in the size of the 
informal economy by 0.22%. Likewise, the coefficient associated with domestic credit is negative and significant 
at the 5% threshold. A 1% increase in credit leads to a 0.15% drop in informality. Specification 1 (column 2) 
presents the effects of urbanization on informality, taking into account the quality of institutions. It appears that 
in the presence of the variable quality of institutions, the positive effect of the urbanization rate on growth 
decreases. Indeed, the effect of the 1% increase in the urbanization rate on the size of the informal economy 
drops from 0.80% to 0.74%. This therefore means that the quality of institutions plays a role in the relationship 
between urbanization and the informal economy. It also appears that the quality of institutions has a negative and 
significant effect on the size of the informal economy. Indeed, the coefficient associated with the institution 
variable is negative and significant at the 1% level. Thus, an improvement in the quality of institutions leads to a 
decrease in informality. 
The research results therefore show that urbanization is a driver of the informal economy in the WAEMU 
countries. Urbanization, which manifests itself in the increase in the number of inhabitants of urban areas to the 
detriment of rural areas, also leads to increased unemployment in cities. In fact, the migrants who arrive in the 
cities, for the most part do not have the skills to be employed by formal companies, for positions of high 
responsibility. Most of them are therefore content with precarious jobs and others go into the informal sector in 
order to meet their needs. This therefore contributes to increasing the size of the informal economy. 
Notwithstanding these facts, this result confirms those of several authors such as Rei and Bhattacharya (2008), 
Gundogan and Bicerli (2009), and Elgin and Oyvat (2013). 
Contrary to expectations, real GDP per capita has a positive effect on the size of the informal economy. 
This result, although unexpected, is validated by studies, in this case that of Ouédraogo (2017), with regard to 
the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. He explains this paradox by the fact that the participation of the informal 
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sector in the formation of national income. In developing countries, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa, 
informal entrepreneurs do not operate completely in the shadows, as there are taxation systems in the informal 
sector. One of the reasons given to explain the development of informality is the level of the unemployment rate 
according to some authors. Torgler and Schneider (2007), Dreher and Schneider (2008) and Rei and 
Bhattacharya (2008) find empirical evidence that supports this hypothesis. Research also shows that an increase 
in agriculture's share of GDP increases the size of informality. This result is consistent with that of Torgler and 
Schneider (2009). 
On the other hand, it also turns out that education can reduce informality. This result confirms that of 
Traoré (2016) who found in his study on Burkina Faso, using a general equilibrium model, that the higher the 
level of education of an individual, the less he will engage in activities Likewise, domestic credit has a negative 
effect on the size of the informal sector. Indeed, the credit granted by financial institutions is given to companies 
operating in the formal sector. Thus, an increase in these credits will encourage companies operating in the 
informal sector to formalize themselves in order to benefit from the financing. Also, access to bank credit could 
help small-scale informal enterprises whose turnover does not allow them to join the formal to increase their 
productivity and thus their turnover which would allow them to be formalized and thus reduce the size of the 
informal sector. This result is consistent with that of Rei and Bhattacharya (2008). It should also be noted that 
improving the quality of institutions hinders the development of informality. This result confirms those of Torger 
and Schneider (2009) and more recently by Maulida and Darwanto (2018). Also, it also emerges that in the 
presence of the quality of institutions, the effect of urbanization on the informal sector is attenuated. Which 
therefore leads us in the following to examine the possibility of a non-linear relationship between the informal 
economy, the rate of urbanization, and the quality of institutions. 
 Robustness analysis 
We use the synthetic index of the informal economy to assess the robustness of our results to a change of proxy. 
The results are shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 below. It appears that the effects of the different variables 
on the informal economy are the same regardless of the informality proxy used. We can therefore conclude that 
our results are robust. 
Table 3: Results of the long-term analysis 
 (1) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES EI EI ISEI ISEI 
     
ec -0,427*** -0,449*** -0,370** -0,317** 
 (0,126) (0,144) (0,155) (0,138) 
Urbanization rate 0,800** 0,742** 1,352* 2,326*** 
 (0,346) (0,318) (0,750) (0,676) 
Real GDP per capita 1,65e-05** 1,75e-05** 0,000163*** 0,000158*** 
 (8,10e-06) (8,32e-06) (2,13e-05) (4,98e-05) 
Taxation 0,0851 0,00965 1,727*** -0,646* 
 (0,205) (0,190) (0,580) (0,337) 
Unemployment 0,864* 1,061** -0,371 -1,718** 
 (0,476) (0,493) (0,677) (0,715) 
Education -0,227*** -0,192*** -0,853*** -0,680*** 
 (0,0588) (0,0547) (0,157) (0,133) 
credit  -0,159** -0,255*** 0,398*** 0,587*** 
 (0,0655) (0,0669) (0,146) (0,149) 
Agriculture 0,628*** 0,543*** 1,690*** -0,341* 
 (0,134) (0,119) (0,337) (0,206) 
Institutions  -17,23**  -106,4*** 
  (7,624)  (23,82) 
Constant 1,629 9,153*** -37,74 9,803** 
 (2,261) (3,364) (23,26) (4,972) 
     
Observations 171 171   
Source: author using data from IMF (2018), WDI (2018) and WGI (2018) 
Standard deviations are in parentheses 
(*), (**), (***) Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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 Analysis of the non-linearity between the rate of urbanization, the informal economy and the 
quality of institutions 
Table 4 presents the non-linear effects of urbanization on the size of the informal economy through the quality of 
institutions. The estimate shows that there is a level of institutional quality where urbanization and the size of 
informality have a negative relationship. Before this threshold there is a positive relationship between these two. 
This shows the need for nonlinear exploration. Indeed, the increase in the quality of institutions allows first of all 
a decrease in the rate of urbanization, because it makes it possible to reduce urbanization which aims to find jobs, 
by creating one of the sources of activity adapted to the rural environment (dam construction for market 
gardening, etc.). Secondly, the good quality of the institutions also allows the professional integration of new 
urbanites. It is therefore easy to understand that improving the quality of institutions reduces the effect of 
urbanization on the size of the informal economy. 
We also perform a robustness analysis using another indicator of the size of the informal economy, namely 
the Synthetic Index of the Informal Economy (ISEI). The results of the estimate recorded in column 2 of Table X 
confirm the previous analysis. Indeed, there is still evidence that an improvement in the quality of institutions 
reduces the effect of urbanization on the size of the informal economy. 
Table 4: Result of the nonlinear analysis 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES EI ISSI 
   
Real GDP per capita 4,06e-05*** 4,55e-05*** 
 (9,26e-06) (1,50e-05) 
Taxation -0,348*** -0,454*** 
 (0,0754) (0,122) 
Unemployment -0,605*** -1,345*** 
 (0,144) (0,232) 
Education -0,0359 -0,0583 
 (0,0283) (0,0457) 
Crédit intérieur  -0,200*** -0,313*** 
 (0,0395) (0,0638) 
Agriculture -0,0498 -0,0681 
 (0,0582) (0,0941) 
Urbanization rate 0,132* 0,133* 
 (0,102) (0,165) 
Urbanization rate -0,242** -0,048* 
 (0,103) (0,167) 
Constant 65,36*** 24,48*** 
 (3,516) (5,684) 
   
Observations 189 189 
R2 0,639 0,377 
Number of countries 7 7 
Source: author using data from IMF (2018), WDI (2018) and WGI (2018) 
Standard deviations are in parentheses 
(*), (**), (***) Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
Conclusion 
This research aimed to determine the relationship (direct and not direct) between the rate of urbanization and 
informality in the UEMOA zone, by formulating the hypothesis that the latter may be affected by the level of 
institutional quality. The observations cover the period 1991-2017. The results of the dependence tests having 
shown inter-individual independence, we stuck to the first generation stationarity tests, which shows that some 
study variables are not stationary at level, we then proceeded to a test of first generation cointegration namely 
Pedroni (1999). The results of the latter show that the variables used are cointegrated. These results of the tests 
on the data therefore led us to estimate our direct relationship using the pooled mean group (PMG) method. And 
for the nonlinear analysis between urbanization and informality conditioned by the quality of institutions, we opt 
for a regime change model. 
Our results show that the rate of urbanization has a positive effect on the informality of the countries of the 
WAEMU zone. It also appears that the quality of institutions affects this relationship. Indeed, we find that if the 
quality of institutions reaches 0.57 then the urbanization rate decreases so that the informal economy does not 
increase any more. It also emerges that the unemployment rate and the real GDP per capita positively affect the 
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size of the informal economy, on the other hand the level of education and domestic credit negatively affect the 
latter. This research shows that in order to reduce informality in the countries of the zone, all other things being 
equal, political decision-makers will have to improve the quality of institutions, which would make it possible to 
create off-season activities in order to allow populations find income-generating activities in rural areas, which 
would reduce urbanization linked to the search for subsistence employment. 
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Table 1: Result of dependency analysis 
Test                                                 Statistiques                                             P – value  
Specification 1 
Frees CD                                             0,357                                                          - 
Friedman CD                                      33,874                                                    0,925 
Pesaran CD                                         3,686                                                      0,075 
 
Specification 2 
Frees CD                                             0,396                                                          - 
Friedman CD                                      23,622                                       0,135 
Pesaran CD                                         3,647                                                      0,075 
 
Specification 3 
Frees CD                                             0,410                                                         - 
Friedman CD                                      25,336                                      0,119 
Pesaran CD                                         3,930                                                     0,083 
Specification 4 
Frees CD                                             0,370                                                          - 
Friedman CD                                      21,025                                                    0,120 
Pesaran CD                                         2,539                                                      0,095 
Source: author using data from WDI and IMF (2018) 
 
Table 2: Unit root test results 
Variables Niveau Différence Première 

















Credit 5.752 4.969 -2.341*** -4.232*** 
 (1.000) (1.000) (0.009) (0.000) 
INST -1.287* -2.106* -3.655*** -5.437*** 

















EDU 0,81106 -2,135** -2,13472*** -2,85798*** 









Source: author using data from IMF (2018), WDI (2018) and WGI (2018) 
Standard deviations are in parentheses 
(*), (**), (***) Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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Table 3: Result of the cointegration test 
    
Statistiques  Valeur Valeur de p 
Spécification 1 
Panel v -1,604  0,005 
Panel rho  3,062  0,008 
Panel PP -3,246  0,000 
Panel ADF -1,703  0,044 
Group rho  4,093  1,000 
Group PP -4,858  0,000 
Group ADF -0,973  0,015 
Spécification 2 
Panel v -1,684  0,004 
Panel rho  2,749  0,037 
Panel PP -5,709  0,000 
Panel ADF -3,939  0,000 
Group rho  3,536  0,999 
Group PP -5,126  0,000 
Group ADF -2,759  0,003 
Spécification 3 
Panel v -0,262  0,035 
Panel rho  2,744  0,007 
Panel PP -0,958  0,009 
Panel ADF -1,959  0,025 
Group rho  3,730  0,999 
Group PP -2,823  0,002 
Group ADF -1,588  0,041 
Spécification 4 
Panel v  0,093  0,030 
Panel rho  2,390  0,016 
Panel PP -2,964  0,001 
Panel ADF -2,696  0,003 
Group rho  3,404  0,999 
Group PP -5,494  0,000 
Group ADF -2,453  0,007 
Source: author using data from IMF (2018), WDI (2018) and WGI (2018) 
Standard deviations are in parentheses 
(*), (**), (***) Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
Table 4: Result of Hausman tests 
Specification 1 : 
Variables mg pmg Difference S,E, 
UR 2,659 -1,847 4,506 10,707 
GDP -0,0001 -0,0016 -0,004 0,004 
TAX 3,424 -0,580 4,004 10,756 
Unemployment 52,033 -0,501 52,534 193,63 
Credit -0,5344 -0,299 -0,235 4,064 
EDU -0,9755 0,3427 -1,318 2,765 
Agriculture -0,1364 0,0189 -,155 1,611 
 Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
      chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                  = 10,03    
 Prob>chi2 = 0,185  
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Specification 2   
Variables  mg pmg Difference S,E, 
UR 2,325 0,582 1,743 4,998 
GDP -0,0007 0,0002 -0,0001 0,0002 
TAX 1,060 0,0447 1,016 2,187 
Unemployment 20,948 -1,214 22,163 55,413 
Credit 0,493 0,3195 0,174 0,4562 
EDU -0,499 -0,188 -0,311 0,412 
Agriculture -0,1364 0,0189 -,155 1,611 
INST 5,050 -35,634 40,683 102,979 
 Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 chi2(7)      = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                  =      4,22 
Prob>chi2 = 0,7541 
 
 
Source: author using data from IMF (2018), WDI (2018) and WGI (2018) 
Specification 3  
Variables mg pmg Difference S.E. 
TU 2,743735 1,351978 1,391757 10,40301 
PIBh -0,0000187 0,0001629 -0,0001816 0,0003462 
TAX 2,881382 1,726939 1,154443 4,936189 
TC -117,0601 -0,370886 -116,6892 273,0105 
Primaire -0,6767582 -0,8528581 0,1760999 0,6043085 
CI 0,6069564 0,3978867 0,2090697 1,092265 
AGRI 0,698635 1,690395 -0,99176 1,316114 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
 chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
 =        2,04  
 Prob>chi2 =      0,9163 
Source: author using data from IMF (2018), WDI (2018) and WGI (2018) 
Specification 4  
Variables  mg pmg Difference S.E. 
UR 3.955477 2.325677 1.6298 15.08509 
GDP -.0001145 .0001579 -.0002724 .0004394 
TAX 3.016603 -.6461956 3.662798 6.161968 
Unemployment -107.6233 -1.718297 -105.905 329.419 
Credit -.8308491 -.6795388 -.1513103 .8232221 
EDU .6739105 .5868708 .0870397 1.493246 
Agriculture .6595411 -.3413399 1.000881 1.514463 
INST 18.33929 -106.4077 124.747 121.8117 
 Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
= 10,03 
Prob>chi2 =      0,185 
Source: author using data from IMF (2018), WDI (2018) and WGI (2018) 
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Table 5: Result of the linearity test 
 
Interaction variables Inst 
Two regimes (single threshold)  
threshold 1̂   0,575 
IC (95%) [0,571 ; 0,577] 
LR-test (p-value)   27,30  (0,016)  





IC (95%) [0,476 ; 0,480] 
LR-test (p-value)  3,97  (0,903)  
Source: author using data from IMF (2018), WDI (2018) and WGI (2018) 
 
